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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ROLANDO CARDONA-GUETON, : Case No. 20110146-CA 
Appellant is incarcerated. 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count Possession With 
Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a first degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (2009), enhanced pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(v) 
(2009) in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Judith Atherton, presiding. See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment). This case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (Supp. 2009). 
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
Issue: Park enhancement: Did the State present sufficient evidence to prove that the 
offense, which occurred on the sidewalk at the corner of 400 South and 300 West, was 
committed in a "drug-free zone," defined by statute as "in a public park"? 
Preservation/Standard of Review: This issue was preserved at R. 175:151-52. "When a 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
jury verdict is challenged on the ground that the evidence is insufficient.. .we review the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict... .We reverse... only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255,1j 15, 167 P.3d 503 (citations and internal 
quotations omitted); State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175, ^  2, 51 P.3d 21 (in reviewing 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's verdict, this Court reviews "the record 
facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict"). 
Issue: Knowledge and constructive possession of drugs: In arguing its theory of 
constructive possession, did the State present evidence sufficient to prove (i) 
"possession" where the evidence failed to establish a sufficient nexus between Cardona-
Gueton and the drugs, and (ii) that he had the knowledge, ability, and intent to exercise 
dominion and control over the drugs? 
Preservation/Standard of Review: This issue was preserved at R. 175:151. When a jury 
verdict is challenged on the ground that the evidence is insufficient, an appellate court 
will consider the facts in a light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Layman, 1999 UT 
79, Tf 12, 985 P.2d 911. "An appellate court should overturn a conviction for insufficient 
evidence when it is apparent that there is not sufficient competent evidence as to each 
element of the crime charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant committed the crime." Id (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784-85 
(Utah 1991)). Reversal is required "when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, If 15, 167 P.3d 503 (citations and internal quotations 
omitted); State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175, ^  2, 51 P.3d 21 (in reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's verdict, this Court reviews "the record 
facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict"). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to the issues on appeal. Their text is 
provided in full in Addendum B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); and 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(v) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State filed an information on October 27, 2009, charging Rolando Cardona-
Gueton with one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, 
a second degree felony. R. 1-2. The State filed an amended information on May 7, 2010. 
R. 58-59. Cardona-Gueton was charged in this final information with one count of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute in a Drug-Free Zone, a 
first degree felony. Id. A copy of this final information is attached hereto as Addendum 
C. 
Voir dire commenced on September 7, 2010. R. 175:3. A one-day jury trial was 
held on September 7, 2010. R. 175. The jury convicted Cardona-Gueton as charged. R. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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175:154-55. On January 14, 2011, the court sentenced Cardona-Gueton to an 
indeterminate term of 5 years to life. R. 177:9. 
Cardona-Gueton filed a timely notice for appeal. R. 163. This case was transferred 
from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. R. 169-72. This appeal follows. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officers Observe Cardona-Gueton on the Corner of 400 South and 300 West. 
On October 22, 2009, Officers Ammon Mauga, Mike Cardwell and Kristopher 
Jeppsen observed Mr. Rolando Cardona-Gueton ("Cardona-Gueton") speaking to another 
person near a bench on the comer of 400 South 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah. R. 
175:51, 79-80. According to Officer Mauga, Cardona-Gueton and the other individual 
"look[ed] around" before approaching one another. R. 175:51-52. After the two men 
approached each other, "they once again looked around [], and then they went separate 
ways." R. 175:52. Although the officers never saw the two individuals speak or make any 
physical contact, the officers suspected a drug transaction and approached Cardona-
Gueton. R. 175:51-53,60. 
As the officers approached, Cardona-Gueton sat down on a bench on the sidewalk 
and began to smoke a cigarette. R. 175:52-53. Officer Cardwell believed that Cardona-
Gueton was violating an outdoor smoking ordinance and began issuing a citation. R. 
175:53, 64. While Officer Cardwell was writing the citation, Officer Mauga noticed a 
bicycle leaning against the bench which appeared to be a "high quality" red bike that had 
been spray-painted black. R. 175:53, 64, 81-82. Recalling a recent bulletin about a 
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missing red bike, Officer Mauga thought the fact that the bike was spray-painted signaled 
that "it possibly could be stolen." IdL at 53. 
Officer Mauga asked Cardona-Gueton if the bicycle was his. Id. Cardona-Gueton 
responded "yeah." Id. Officer Jeppsen asked Cardona-Gueton if he "could look at [the 
bike]" and Cardona-Gueton said yes. R. 175:81. The officers testified that they had seen 
Cardona-Gueton multiple times before in the park, but that they had never seen him with 
a bike. R. 175:66-67. 
Officer Jeppsen "flipped" the bike "upside down so [he] could look at the serial 
number." R. 175:54, 83-84. Once Officer Jeppsen turned the bike over, he discovered a 
hidden compartment in between the fork of the handlebars. R. 175:54, 83-84. The officer 
inquired about the compartment. Id. In response, Cardona-Gueton admitted to the officers 
it wasn't actually his bike. R. 175:54. A search of the hidden compartment revealed 
fourteen rocks of crack cocaine which was the basis of the arrest. R. 175:89. Upon a 
search incident to arrest, officers recovered $166 in cash. R. 175:71, 75. No drugs or drug 
paraphernalia were found on Cardona-Gueton. R. 175:111-12. The officers never verified 
whether or not the bike was stolen. R. 137:70, 99. 
Cardona-Gueton's Testimony. 
Cardona-Gueton testified that he arrived by bus to the corner of 400 South 300 
West, Salt Lake City, Utah on October 22, 2009. R. 175:120. When he arrived at that 
location, he sat down on a bench on the sidewalk. R. 175:121. Near the bench was a 
lamppost which had a bicycle leaning against it. Id. at 121. He began to read a letter and 
smoke. Id. at 122-23. It was at this point he noticed police officers approaching him. Id. 
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at 122-23. He testified that because he speaks Spanish, and the police officers were 
talking to him in English, he did not understand what they were saying to him.1 R. 
175:122-23. Cardona-Gueton denied that the drugs were his and denied knowing "that 
there were drugs inside that bicycle." R. 175:123. He explained that the $166 was from a 
check he cashed from Social Security's Supplemental Security Income program. R. 
175:124. 
Motion to Dismiss. 
At the close of the State's case at trial, Cardona-Gueton moved for a directed 
verdict on the application of the "drug-free zone" penalty enhancement, arguing that 
there was insufficient evidence that the drug-related offense had been committed "in a 
public park." R. 175:151-52. The trial court summarily denied the motion. R. 175:52. A 
jury found Cardona-Gueton guilty of possession with intent to distribute a controlled 
substance in a drug-free zone. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and to arrest judgment, which the trial court denied. R. 130, 
158-59. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Cardona-Gueton committed a drug-related offense "in a public park" as required by the 
drug penalty enhancement statute. The State's evidence established only the address of 
the offense. Officers Mauga and Jeppsen testified that the offense occurred at 400 South 
1
 The officers spoke to him in English and did not call for a Spanish-speaking officer. R. 
175:64, 67-69. Cardona-Gueton used a Spanish interpreter at trial. R. 175:25-26. 
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300 West in the "area" of Pioneer Park. The State is required to produce independent 
evidence that an offense occurred as specifically outlawed by statute. The State failed to 
do so. Moreover, it is unclear whether the jury was adequately instructed on its duty to 
determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense occurred 
in a public park. 
The State also failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Cardona-Gueton 
'possessed' the crack cocaine. The State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Cardona-Gueton had actual or constructive possession of the drugs. The State did not 
produce any evidence of actual possession and failed to present sufficient evidence of 
constructive possession. The State was unable to establish a 'sufficient nexus' between 
Cardona-Gueton and the drugs. Therefore the evidence was sufficiently inconclusive to 
permit an inference that the he had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion 
and control over the drugs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. CARDONA-GUETON'S DRUG PENALTY ENHANCEMENT 
CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERESED BECAUSE THE STATE 
DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE OFFENSE 
OCCURRED "IN A PUBLIC PARK." 
The State failed to proffer evidence sufficient to show that the offense occurred 
"in a public park." The evidence established that the offense was committed on a street 
sidewalk "outside" of Pioneer Park. Where the marshaled evidence shows that Cardona-
Gueton was not in a park, but on a street sidewalk, sitting on a bench located on a paved 
pedestrian walkway facing away from the park, the evidence is legally and factually 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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inconclusive to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed in a 
public park. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) provides heightened sentences for certain drug-
related crimes committed in statutorily defined 'drug-free' locations. Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(4)(a)-(c). A drug-related offense committed "in a public park" is subject to 
increased penalties. Id. 58-37-8(4)(a)(v) (enhancing a second-degree felony to a first-
degree felony). The penalty enhancement provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
constitute elements "of the underlying offense[s] that must be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt. . . to the trier of fact." State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, «f 10, 155 P.3d 909 (citing 
State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)); see also United States v. Smith, 
13 F.3d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that federal drug-free zone enhancement 
statute "constitutes an 'offense5 which has an element of proof that the distribution 
occurred within 1,000 feet of a protected place"); State v. South, 932 P.2d 622, 626-27 
(Utah 1997) (distance element of statute providing heightened sentence for drug-related 
crimes committed within 1000 feet of a church was element of underlying drug offenses 
that the State was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt). Therefore, the State must 
present sufficient evidence that the crime was committed inside a public park. Here the 
State failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the location of the offense —a 
sidewalk at the corner of 400 South and 300 West— was subject to the drug-free zone 
penalty enhancement. 
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a. "In a Public Park" Defined 
Because Cardona-Gueton was charged with, convicted of, and sentenced pursuant 
to the "park" enhancement provision, it is necessary to determine what constitutes a 
"public park." The Utah Controlled Substances Act, codified in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(4)(a) (the "Act"), provides in relevant part: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under 
this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section ... is 
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this 
Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds 
of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or 
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity 
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship []; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie 
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a) (emphasis added). 
The Act does not define "public park." However, the Merriam-Webster Online 
Dictionary states that "park" comes from Old French "pari? meaning enclosure. As a 
noun "park" has a number of definitions, the most common of which include: 
1 a: an enclosed piece of ground stocked with game and held by royal prescription 
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or grant b: a tract of land that often includes lawns, woodland, and pasture 
attached to a country house and is used as a game preserve and for recreation 2 a: 
a piece of ground in or near a city or town kept for ornament and recreation b: an 
area maintained in its natural state as a public property. 
See Park, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/park?show=0&t=l 311873682 (last visited July 28, 2011); see 
also Park, Online Etymology Dictionary, 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=:park (last visited July 28, 2011); Park, 
Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/park (last visited July 28, 2011). 
Utah modeled its drug penalty enhancement statute after the Federal Controlled 
Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984. See Tape of House Floor Debates, 44th 
Legislature, General Session (Feb. 12, 1986) (Statement of Rep. Moss); see also 
Powasnik, 918 P.2d at 149; State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 59 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). While the Utah Act 
classifies the inside of "public parks" as drug-free zones, the comparable provision in the 
federal act classifies "playgrounds" as drug-free zones and goes on to define that term as: 
any outdoor facility (including any parking lot appurtenant thereto) intended for 
recreation, open to the public, and with any portion thereof containing three or 
more separate apparatus intended for the recreation of children including, but not 
limited to, sliding boards, swingsets, and teeterboards. 
21 U.S.C. § 860(e). 
The common usage and meaning of "public park" does not include paved 
walkways created for pedestrian use on the outer perimeter of a city block. These are 
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sidewalks.2 Sidewalks are not parks "intended for the recreation of children" and they are 
not enclosed grounds "kept for ornament and recreation." 
Other provisions found in the Utah Code specifically distinguish a public "park" 
from a "sidewalk" and treat each independently. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-
902(5)(a) defines a "public place" as "any location or structure to which the public or a 
substantial group of the public has access, and includes: 
(i) a sidewalk, street, or highway; 
(ii) a public park, public recreation facility, or any other area open to the public... 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-902 (emphasis added). In other sections of the Utah Code, 
the legislature also distinguishes a sidewalk from a park: 
A municipal legislative body may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, narrow, 
extend, grade, pave, or otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, 
sidewalks, parks, airports, parking lots, or other facilities for the parking of 
vehicles off streets, public grounds, and pedestrian malls and may vacate the same 
or parts thereof, as provided in this title. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8 (emphasis added).3 Additionally, the Salt Lake City Code 
states that a "street" "means and includes alleys, lanes, courts, boulevards, public ways, 
public squares, public places and sidewalks." See Salt Lake City Code § 1.04.010. 
"Sidewalk" is defined as "a usually paved walk for pedestrians at the side of a street." 
See Sidewalk, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/sidewalk (last visited July 26, 2011). 
3
 Other jurisdictions have similar statutes that differentiate a park from a sidewalk. See, 
e.g., Ark. Code. Ann. § 14-54-105 (West 2011) (cities can alter or change the width or 
extension of streets, sidewalks, alleys, avenues, parks, wharves, and other public 
grounds). 
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In this case, Cardona-Gueton was sitting on a bench4 located on a street sidewalk. 
Officer Jeppsen testified that the location of the offense occurred in the "area" of Pioneer 
Park. R. 175:80; see also Addendum C (the affidavit of probable cause states that "while 
on routine bike patrol in the area of 400 South 300 West..." (emphasis added)). He later 
testified that the outside corner of 400 South 300 West was "in the park." R 175:98 (on 
cross examination, defense counsel asked him if the incident took place on the outside 
corner of 400 South 300 West and he responded "[y]eah, it's in the park."). 
Contrary to Officer Jeppsen's later assertion, see id-, Pioneer Park is distinctly 
separate from the sidewalk where Cardona-Gueton was arrested. Pioneer Park is enclosed 
by a paved walkway and is additionally surrounded by a gravel path. Both the paved 
walkway and the gravel path separate the enclosed park from the sidewalk where 
Cardona-Gueton was located. 
Next, for the park enhancement to apply, the crime must be committed "in a public 
park" rather than next to or even nearby a public park. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
Counsel and witnesses referred to the location where Cardona-Gueton was sitting as 
both a 'bench' and a 'park bench.' Compare R. 175:53 (Officer Mauga testified that 
"[t]he defendant was sitting on the bench and the bike was just right next to him leaning 
on the bench."), and R. 175:64 (the State asks Officer Mauga "[n]ow when you came to 
the corner of 4th and 3rd, Rolando was sitting on the bench?"), with R. 175:61 (the State 
asks Officer Mauga "[f]rom the park bench, where exactly did they - were they standing 
together when you saw them?" Officer Mauga responds "I'd say about five feet from the 
park bench."). In sum, the terms 'bench' and 'park bench' were used interchangeably at 
trial. Additionally, although a "park bench" can denote a bench that is located near a 
park, the common understanding of a "park bench" refers more generally to a type of 
bench. For example, a search of "park bench" in amazon.com results in multiple options-
for-purchase of a distinct type of bench which can be used in a home or a garden. See 
Park Bench, amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/s/ref:=nb_sb_noss?url::=search-
alias%3Daps&field-keywords=park+bench (last visited July 26, 2011). 
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8(4)(a)(v) (emphasis added). T he sidewalk at which Cardona-Gueton was located is not 
a "public park" and is not "in" Pioneer Park. The statute defines certain drug-free zones 
as extending to "any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds," 
of certain narrowly defined locations. However, the extended area only applies to 
"Subsection 4(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii)," and not Subsection 4(a)(v) -the "park" 
provision. Therefore, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was 
committed in a park. 
If the legislature intended to create 'drug-free' locations on street sidewalks, or 
sidewalks near "any area that is within 1,000 feet" of a public park, it would have used 
language to provide for that. Instead, the legislature specifically chose to create drug-free 
zones within public parks, not "in and/or around" public parks. "Where statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond to divine legislative 
intent." State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ^  11, 122 P.3d 615 (citations omitted); State v. 
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1990) (Durham, J., dissenting) ("[T]he court has 
no power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an intention not expressed."). 
b. The Evidence was Insufficient to Establish the Offense was Committed 
"in a public park" 
The evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a drug-
related offense was committed "in a public park." The marshaled evidence establishes 
that Cardona-Gueton was on a street sidewalk at the corner of 400 South and 300 West 
near Pioneer Park. 
In determining whether there was sufficient evidence to convict a defendant, 
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appellate courts do not examine whether the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,118, 10 P.3d 346. Rather, courts look at 
whether, after viewing all the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence was "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.5' Id. f^ 18 (quoting 
State v. Dunn, 850P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). 
To convict Cardona-Gueton under the drug penalty enhancement provision, there 
had to be sufficient evidence, including the logical and reasonable inferences that could 
be drawn therefrom, that Cardona-Gueton committed a drug-related offense "in a public 
park." The following evidence was before the court: 
1. Cardona-Gueton was sitting at a bench on the street corner of 400 South and 
300 West. R. 175:62, 64. Pioneer Park is in the "area" of 400 South and 300 
West. R. 175:80; see also Addendum C (the affidavit of probable cause states 
that "while on routine bike patrol in the area of 400 South 300 West..."). 
2. The bicycle containing the drugs was leaning against a bench (R. 175:53) or a 
street lamppost (R. 175:121) on the sidewalk at the intersection of 400 South 
and 300 West. 
3. Pioneer Park has a reputation as a high drug sales area. R. 175:80. 
4. The bench was facing away from Pioneer Park, toward the road. See State's 
Exs. 1 & 2. 
5. Officer Jeppsen testified that the outside corner of 400 South and 300 West 
was in the park. R. 175:98. 
6. Officers approached Cardona-Gueton to issue a citation for "smoking in the 
park." R. 175:53, 80. 
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7. Cardona-Gueton was never officially cited for smoking in a public park. R. 
175:53,81-82. 
Here, after marshaling the evidence and drawing inferences in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, it can only be said that the crime occurred on a bench on 
the street corner outside of Pioneer Park. State's Exhibits Numbers 1 and 2 clearly show 
that the bench was on the sidewalk, facing away from the park, toward the roadway. Both 
officers testified that the defendant and the bicycle were located on the corner of 400 
South and 300 West. The State presented no witnesses from the City with actual 
knowledge of whether the sidewalk was part of the park. The State's witnesses merely 
testified as to the address, that it was on the comer, and that Pioneer Park was located "in 
that area." R. 175:80. 
Although it is clear from the testimony that the officers treated the corner as if it 
were inside the park boundaries, neither were qualified to testify as to the park's actual 
boundary line, and neither were specifically asked whether the bench was inside the park. 
The only witness the State directly questioned as to whether the bench was inside the 
park boundary was Cardona-Gueton—who testified that he did not know. R. 175:124. 
Because the State's witnesses only generally referred to the area as Pioneer Park, but did 
not specifically testify that the corner was "inside the park" or that the sidewalk was 
classified as a "public park," the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive and the 
enhancement should be struck from the jury's verdict.5 
5
 The issue is further complicated by the fact that the jury was not specifically instructed 
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense occurred in a public park. The jury was 
instructed: 
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Before you can convict, ROLANDO CARDONA-GUETON of the offense of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a First Degree 
Felony, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, each and 
every one of the following elements: 
1. That on or about October 22, 2009, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, ROLANDO CARDONA-GUETON; 
2. Did knowingly and intentionally possess Cocaine; 
3. That Cocaine was then and there a controlled substance; and 
4. That at the time of said possession, the defendant intended to 
distribute the substance. 
See Jury Instr. # 12 at R. 115 (emphasis added). 
The Jury was then provided a Special Verdict form which provided that if the jury 
found Cardona-Gueton "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute" that they were to then answer the following question: 
We, the jury, having found the defendant, Rolando Cardona-Gueton, guilty of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute [] 
_ d o 
do not 
find from all the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that in 
committing the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute, the defendant, Roland Cardona-Gueton, committed the offense in a 
public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center. 
See Special Verdict at R. 129. The jury provided an "X" adjacent to the "do" option. 
The use of "[s]pecial verdicts are generally disfavored in criminal trials" because 
they interfere with the fact-finding province of the jury, and with the due process rights of 
criminal defendants. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969) 
(expressing disfavor with special verdicts because they interfere with the "constitutional 
guarantees of due process and trial by jury [which] require that a criminal defendant be 
afforded the full protection of a jury unfettered, directly or indirectly"); Tillman v. Cook, 
25 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1288 (D. Utah 1998) (discussing general disfavor of special verdicts 
in criminal cases); see also Kate H. Nepveu, Beyond "Guilty" or "Not Guilty": Giving 
Special Verdicts in Criminal Jury Trials, 21 Yale L. & PoPy Rev. 263, 283 (2003) 
(discussing general disfavor of special verdicts and discounting analogies that equate 
special verdicts to jury instructions; finding that, although "[t]he information received 
from the jury may make special verdicts desirable, [] it is not considered injury 
instruction precedents" and only instructs juries in "how to fill out the form"). 
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Because the evidence presented at trial was "sufficiently inconclusive" as to 
whether the offense occurred "in a public park" and because it is unclear whether the jury 
understood its role in determining whether the offense was committed "in a public park," 
this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial, or, alternatively, the enhancement 
should be struck from the jury's verdict, effectively reducing the conviction from a first 
degree to a second degree. 
II. MR. CARDONA-GUETON'S CONVICTION REQUIRES 
REVERSAL BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT HE HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF 
THE DRUGS. 
The evidence was insufficient to prove that Cardona-Gueton was guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The State failed to establish 
a sufficient nexus between Cardona-Gueton and the drugs to establish constructive 
possession. The ownership of the bicycle was in dispute, the bicycle appeared to have 
Although the jury concluded that Cardona-Gueton committed the offense "in a 
public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center," the jury was not instructed on 
this finding. The finding was only noted on the Special Verdict form. No instruction was 
provided to the jury regarding its duty to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense 
was committed in a public park and no instruction was given as to what qualifies as being 
"in a public park." Hence, although the Special Verdict form indicates that the jury found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed in a public park, the jury was 
never instructed that this was an element and was never provided a definition of "in a 
public park." 
Moreover, jury instruction #12 inaccurately stated the law. Instruction #12 
provided that Cardona-Gueton would be convicted of a first degree felony if the four 
elements were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Standing alone, the instruction was a 
misstatement of the law. Cardona-Gueton could only be found guilty of a second degree 
felony based on the jury finding the four elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt. For 
Cardona-Gueton to be found guilty of a first degree felony, the jury needed also to find 
that he committed the offense in a protected, 'drug-free' location. 
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been stolen, the hidden compartment containing the drugs was not visible without turning 
the bicycle upside down for a close inspection, and the State offered no direct evidence 
that Cardona-Gueton had knowledge of the drugs beyond what was inferred by his 
contradictory claims as to the ownership of the bicycle. Therefore, the evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that Cardona-Gueton had the knowledge, ability, and intent to exercise dominion 
and control over the crack cocaine. 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and will reverse the jury's decision "only if 
[it is] determine[d] that reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict." See State 
v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^ 29, 122 P.3d 639 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18 (if the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted" then reversal is 
required). Conviction of possession with intent to distribute requires proof of two 
elements: "(1) that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled 
substance, and (2) that defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance to 
another." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985); see also Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8. Possession of a controlled substance sufficient to sustain a conviction need not be 
actual. A conviction may also be based on constructive possession. State v. Martin, 2011 
UT App 112,12, 251 P.3d 860 (citing Fox, 709 P.2d at 318-19). 
To prove constructive possession, "it is necessary to prove that there was a 
18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the accused 
had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug." Id. ^ 
2. In cases where the State relies on a theory of constructive possession, the State's 
"burden entails a presentation of extensive and detailed facts" and "lack of such evidence 
may well make it impossible for the State to fulfill its duty to establish-beyond a 
reasonable doubt-the necessary nexus between a defendant and the [drugs]; any 
significant deficiency in evidence establishing the nexus almost always leaves room for [] 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 791-
92 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
The sufficiency of the nexus depends upon the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case. Martin, 2011 UT App 112, ^ } 2. Courts look at various factors which may 
indicate constructive possession, including, but not limited to: 
(1) Ownership and/or occupancy (State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991)); 
(2) The defendant's presence at the time the drugs were found, with emphasis 
on the fact that the drugs were in plain or open view (Layman, 953 P.2d at 
788); 
(3) Evidence indicating that the "defendant was participating with others in the 
mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband" (Id.); 
(4) Presence of drug paraphernalia among the defendant's personal effects 
(Fox, 709 P.2d at 320); and 
(5) Incriminating statements or behavior (Martin, 2011 UT App 112, *[j 3) 
(finding constructive possession of drugs which were found in back seat of 
patrol car where defendant had been "moving around suspiciously.. .leaning 
forward and fidgeting around"); State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 
911 (instructing appellate courts to be mindful that factors indicating 
constructive possession are not exhaustive, and should be used only as 
"relevant considerations in making the underlying determination"). 
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Another factor which may indicate constructive possession is whether the drugs 
were present "in a specific area over which the accused had control." See Martin, 2011 
UT App 112,13. For example, in Martin, the court found a sufficient nexus where the 
accused was the only person to occupy the back seat of the patrol car where drugs were 
found and where the drugs were located in the exact same area where the accused's hands 
had been. Id. 
However, evidence of any of the above-listed indicators is not by itself 
determinative of constructive possession, and must "be considered within the totality of 
the circumstances presented." Layman, 953 P.2d at 788-89. For example, while 
ownership and occupancy is a factor to consider, "[a] sufficient nexus is not established 
by mere ownership and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs [were] found 
... especially when occupancy is not exclusive." Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added) ("In order to find that the accused was in possession of drugs 
found in an automobile he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to, 
there must be other evidence to buttress such an inference."). 
Similarly, even in cases where the accused exhibited incriminating behavior, if the 
evidence was "inconclusive" as to whether "the drugs were subject to the defendant's 
dominion and control" and as to whether "the defendant had the intent to exercise that 
control," no sufficient nexus exists. See Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^  16. For example, in 
Layman, the accused and his passenger were in transit, selling drugs. Layman, 953 P.2d 
782, 793 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, granted. State v. Layman, 982 P.2d 87 (Utah Aug. 
11, 1998), affd. State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911. The accused was pulled 
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over and the police officer asked the passenger if he could search the pouch in her 
waistband. Id. The officer testified that the passenger looked nervously at the accused for 
guidance and the accused engaged in incriminating behavior by "shaking his head in a 
negative fashion back and forth [] thus demonstrating that he had some control over the 
drugs." Id Nonetheless, because it was inconclusive that the accused "had the knowledge, 
ability, and intent to exercise dominion and control over the contraband" the court 
concluded the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Id at 789 (emphasis 
added). 
Even in situations where the State can show that an accused knew of the existence 
of contraband and its potential for illegal use, that does not amount to possession unless 
the State can also establish the accused's personal intent to make use of that knowledge. 
Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501, 503 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In Bryan, police 
executed a search warrant on the defendant's home and discovered paraphernalia in plain 
view within the home. Id. at 502. The court noted that although the defendant "most 
certainly knew . . . of the items . . . knowledge and ability to possess do not equal 
possession where there is no evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge." Id. at 503 
(internal citations omitted). The State's evidence "must raise a reasonable inference that 
defendant was engaged in a criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander." Id (quoting 
Fox, 709 P.2d at 319-20). In short, "to show constructive possession, the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs were subject to the defendant's dominion and 
control and the defendant had the intent to exercise that control." Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^ 
16 (citing Fox, 709 P.2d at 318). 
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To convict Cardona-Gueton, there had to be sufficient evidence, including the 
logical and reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, that there was a 
sufficient nexus between Cardona-Gueton and the drugs to establish "possession." The 
following evidence was before the court: 
1. The crack cocaine was found in a hidden compartment within the frame of a 
bicycle. R. 175:92-93. 
2. The bicycle containing the drugs was leaning against a bench (R. 175:53) or a 
street lamppost (R. 175:121) on the sidewalk at the intersection of 400 South 
and 300 West. R. 175:53,64. 
3. Officer Mauga had seen Cardona-Gueton on prior occasions, but never with a 
bicycle. R. 175:66. 
4. Both testifying officers expressed belief that the bike was probably stolen. R. 
175:53-54, 81. It was never confirmed whether the bicycle was in fact stolen. 
R. 175:94,99. 
5. Cardona-Gueton initially claimed the bicycle was his. R. 175:53, 81. He 
consented to a search of the bike. R. 175:8. He later denied that the bicycle was 
his when the officer flipped the bicycle upside down and revealed a hidden 
compartment. R. 175:54. 
6. Both officers testified that earlier in the day they had seen Cardona-Gueton 
"grab[] a bottle off of the bike" and drink from it. R. 175:54, 65, 83-84. 
7. Although "nobody else was" around Cardona-Gueton during the arrest, the 
incident occurred during rush hour traffic. R. 175:71, 95-96. 
8. Cardona-Gueton had no credit cards or checks, but did have $166 of cash on 
his person. R. 175:70-71, 75, 91. The officers did not find any drugs or 
paraphernalia on Cardona-Gueton. R. 175:70-71, 75. 
9. The hearsay allegations of prior drug dealing by Cardona-Gueton were 
investigated and dispelled. R. 175:71-73 (Officer Mauga testified that he had 
spoken with Cardona-Gueton on previous occasions because there had been 
"calls of him selling drugs to passerbys"). 
10. Cardona-Gueton made no incriminating statements related to the drugs. R. 
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175:107. 
11. As acknowledged by Officer Jeppsen, Cardona-Gueton did not engage in 
incriminating behavior sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. R. 175:107. 
12. Cardona-Gueton arrived at the corner of 400 South 300 West by bus. R. 
175:120. 
13. The suspicious "cork" blocking the hidden compartment was not visible until 
the bike was turned upside down. R. 175:58-59. 
14. Officers never saw Cardona-Gueton touch the bike, nor were prints taken from 
the bike or the drugs. R. 175:68. 
Here, there was no evidence showing that Cardona-Gueton had actual possession 
of the crack cocaine: therefore, the only basis for conviction would have been that 
Cardona-Gueton was in constructive possession of the crack cocaine. Drawing inferences 
in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the marshaled evidence fails to establish a 
sufficient nexus between Cardona-Gueton and the drugs and, thus, is insufficient to 
support a finding of constructive "possession" such that "the drugs were subject to 
[Cardona-Gueton's] dominion and control and [that he] had the intent to exercise that 
control." Layman, 1999 UT 79, U 16. 
With regard to ownership and/or occupancy of the bike, the State's witnesses 
highlight the inconclusive nature of the evidence. The evidence demonstrates that 
although Cardona-Gueton initially claimed the bike was his, true ownership of the bicycle 
was never established. The officers testified that they believed Cardona-Gueton had stolen 
the bicycle. In fact, the initial search of the bicycle was based on the very nature of the 
officer's belief that the bicycle appeared stolen. Officer Mauga also testified that Cardona-
Gueton had never been observed with this or any other bicycle previously. 
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When the hidden compartment was discovered, Cardona-Gueton disclaimed 
ownership. The State then switched gears and attempted to bolster the inference that 
Cardona-Gueton actually did own the bike. The State presented evidence that earlier in the 
day officers had seen him drink from a water bottle attached to the bike. However, this 
fact was not noted in either of the police officers' reports, was not presented at preliminary 
hearings, and was denied by Cardona-Gueton. R. 175:65-66, 98, 123. Looking at the 
totality of the circumstances, the State's evidence regarding ownership/occupancy tends to 
support Cardona-Gueton's testimony that he discovered the bicycle when he arrived by 
bus earlier in the day. R. 175:120-21. 
Next, although Cardona-Gueton was present when the drugs were found, the drugs 
"were [not] in plain or open view" and in fact could not be seen without flipping the 
bicycle upside down and engaging in a close inspection of the hidden compartment. 
Nothing in the facts supports a reasonable inference that Cardona-Gueton had possession 
of the bicycle long enough to have control of the bike necessary to have stashed the drugs, 
examined the bike, or discovered the hidden compartment. Unlike the accused in Martin, 
there was no evidence that Cardona-Gueton was the only person to "occupy" the bicycle, 
and there was no evidence presented that Cardona-Gueton's hands had been near the 
bicycle, let alone near the hidden compartment where the drugs were found. See R. 175:67 
(Officer Mauga testified that at no time did he see Cardona-Gueton touch the bike). 
The strongest circumstantial indicator of constructive possession is Cardona-
Gueton's potentially incriminating behavior wherein he changed his story about the 
ownership of the bike once the officer flipped over the bicycle and revealed the hidden 
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compartment.6 This is not enough to establish constructive possession. The fact that 
Cardona-Gueton consented to a search of the bicycle suggests that he had no idea the 
bicycle had a hidden compartment containing drugs. R. 175:81 (Cardona-Gueton consents 
to Officer Jeppsen's search of the bicycle); see also R. 48-54 (trial court's Ruling on 
Motion to Suppress; finding that Cardona-Gueton consented to the search). Moreover, 
there was no evidence establishing that Cardona-Gueton knew of the compartment until 
the officers flipped the bike over. Because he made no incriminating statements related to 
the drugs eventually found in the compartment, there is also no evidence that Cardona-
Gueton had knowledge about what was in the compartment. 
Similar to the accused in Layman —where the defendant signaled to his passenger 
to not let the officer search her pouch and where the court found there was no evidence 
that the accused had knowledge of what was in the pouch— here, there is no evidence that 
Cardona-Gueton knew what was in the hidden compartment. It is entirely reasonable that, 
like the accused in Layman, Cardona-Gueton realized that there was some type of 
contraband in the enclosed, hidden compartment and wanted to admit that he did not 
actually own the bike. 
The Court has said that when the only evidence is circumstantial "the evidence 
supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." 
Layman, 953 P.2d at 786. Here an equally reasonable hypothesis is that Cardona-Gueton 
6
 Cardona-Gueton5 s alleged admission that the bike was his qualifies only as 
circumstantial evidence as to whether he owned or knew of the drugs. See Layman, 953 
P.2d at 789 n.6 (distinguishing between testimony that serves as direct evidence of an 
element of a crime and testimony that serves as direct evidence that "goes to the 
establishment of circumstantial evidence"). 
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arrived at the corner of 400 South 300 West and found, purchased, or even stole the 
bicycle while unaware of its hidden contents. It's reasonable that once the officers found 
and directed Cardona-Gueton's attention to a hidden compartment within the bicycle, he 
did not want to be associated with what might be discovered in the hidden compartment of 
the found/purchased/stolen bicycle. 
Lastly, even assuming Cardona-Gueton knew drugs were within the bicycle, the 
State presented no reliable evidence establishing that he had any intent to use them as his 
own. Officers provided no fingerprint evidence; no evidence of current drug use, and no 
evidence of past drug use. Furthermore, although Cardona-Gueton had $166 on his 
person, he did not have any drugs or drug paraphernalia on him. As Cardona-Gueton 
testified, the $166 was from a recently-cashed check he received from Social Security's 
Supplemental Security Income program. R. 175:124.7 
To summarize, based on the totality of the circumstances presented, there is 
insufficient evidence to establish Cardona-Gueton constructively possessed the crack 
cocaine. The State did not present evidence sufficient to show that Cardona-Gueton 
knowingly and intentionally exercised dominion and control over the crack cocaine. 
Because possession was not established, he cannot be found guilty of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute. 
7
 There was no evidence presented as to the amount of cash typically found on drug 
dealers, and no evidence presented regarding the street value of the drugs seized. 
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CONCLUSION 
Cardona-Gueton requests that this Court reverse and remand the case for a new 
trial or, alternatively, reverse the drug-free zone penalty enhancement conviction and 
order that Cardona-Gueton be sentenced accordingly. 
SUBMITTED this 3 day of ^ OM ervJet^T" 2011. 
^ - ^ ^ — ^ — 
Brittany D. Enniss 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 091908492 FS 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
Date: January 14, 2011 
PRESENT 
Clerk: shantec 
Prosecutor: STANGER, CRAIG N 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PRIANO, KERRI S 
Interpreter: Juana Gutierrez (Spanish) 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Language: Spanish 
Date of birth: July 17, 1950 
Audio 
Tape Number: S4 5-11.54 Tape Count: 12.07 
CHARGES 
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/07/2010 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
rBased on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT~TO~DIST 
C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court recommends 450 days credit for time served. 
Attorney Fees Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER 
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Case No: 091908492 Date: Jan 14, 2011 
Defendant transported. 
Date: l/W /11 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
NiChapter37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos) 
*§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts-Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A-Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, 
or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation 
of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert 
with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of 
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled 
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a 
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
marijuana, or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony, 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
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(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may 
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the 
trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or 
possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in 
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree 
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years 
and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, 
and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B-Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance 
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, 
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be 
occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third 
degree felony; or 
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(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of 
the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a 
conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled 
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including a substance listed 
in Section 58-37-4.2, or less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, 
and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior 
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-
I or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one 
degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to 
controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to 
a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not 
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
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(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the persons 
body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, 
causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in 
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-4 
(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree 
felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor. 
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury 
or death as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection 58-37-8 
(2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same episode of driving. 
(3) Prohibited acts C-Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a 
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for 
the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent 
oneself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or 
other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration 
of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be 
attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose receiving 
any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, 
alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false 
name or address; 
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(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, 
or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under 
the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to 
print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, 
or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D-Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this 
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this 
Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those 
schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds 
of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which 
are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or 
institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, 
or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
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(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act 
occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or 
distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of 
any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and 
shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would 
otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) would have been a first 
degree felony. 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less 
than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this 
Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that 
offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided 
by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with 
the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, 
requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit 
a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly 
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was 
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the 
location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware 
that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
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(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (l)(b) and (2)(c), a plea of 
guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance under Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has 
been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance 
agreement. 
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, 
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this chapter. 
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu 
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, 
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a 
bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a 
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a 
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did 
so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the 
veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under the veterinarian's direction and supervision. 
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a 
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the officer's 
employment. 
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as 
defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona 
fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian 
religion as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in 
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, 
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possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in 
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion. 
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense 
under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than 10 days prior to trial. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause 
shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to 
the charges. 
(13)(a) It is an affirmative defense that the person produced, possessed, or administered a 
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if the person: 
(i) was engaged in medical research; and 
(ii) was a holder of a valid license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-
6. 
(b) It is not a defense under Subsection (13)(a) that the person prescribed or dispensed a 
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2. 
(14) It is an affirmative defense that the person possessed, in the person's body, a 
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if: 
(a) the person was the subject of medical research conducted by a holder of a valid 
license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6; and 
(b) the substance was administered to the person by the medical researcher. 
(15) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application. 
(16) A legislative body of a political subdivision may not enact an ordinance that is less 
restrictive than any provision of this chapter. 
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LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CRAIG STANGER, Bar No. 11772 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 






155 S 400 E # 14 








Case No. 091908492 
The undersigned Deputy District Attorney upon a written affidavit states on information 
and belief that the defendant, ROLANDO CARDONA-GUETON, committed the crime of: 
COUNT 1 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE (DFZ), 
2845 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) UCA, first degree felony, as follows: That on or about October 22, 2009 
at 400 South 300 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah the defendant did knowingly and 
intentionally possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute, to wit [specify 
a Schedule I or II substance or controlled substance analog], and committed the offense 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those 
schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any 
of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at 
the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution 
under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
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(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or 
parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in 
Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act occurs; 
or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or distribution of 
a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility 
as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
MICHAEL CARD WELL, TREASA CHOPP, STATE CRIME LAB, KRISTOPHER 
JEPPSEN, AMMON MAUGA, FRANK WERNER, LYNN WRIGHT 
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE: 
Your affiant bases the Information upon the following: 
The statement of Salt Lake City Police Officer K. Jeppsen that on October 22, 2009, 
while on routine bike patrol in the area of 400 South 300 West, Salt Lake County, he observed 
what a appeared to be a possible drug transaction. Officer Jeppsen made contact with defendant 
ROLANDO CARDONA-GUETON who was in possession of 14 rocks of field-tested-positive 
cocaine. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 46-5-101 
(2007) I declare under criminal penalty of the State 
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the 
best of my belief and knowledge. 
Executed on: 
Authorized for presentment and filing 
LOHRA L. MyXER^istrict Attorney 
t)eputy District Attorney 
22nd day df February, 2010 
DM/GG/DAO# 09039165 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
